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Abstract. Consent-based networking, which requires senders to have
permission to send traffic, can protect against multiple attacks on the net-
work. Highly dynamic networks like Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs)
require destination-based consent networking, where consent needs to be
given to send to a destination in any path. These networks are susceptible
to multipath misuses by misbehaving nodes.
In this paper, we identify the misuses in destination-based consent net-
working, and provide solution for detecting and recovering from the mis-
uses. Our solution is based on our previously introduced DIPLOMA ar-
chitecture. DIPLOMA is a deny-by-default distributed policy enforce-
ment architecture that can protect the end-host services and network
bandwidth. DIPLOMA uses capabilities to provide consent for sending
traffic. In this paper, we identify how senders and receivers can mis-
use capabilities by using them in multiple paths, and provide distributed
solutions for detecting those misuses. To that end, we modify the capabil-
ities to aid in misuse detection and provide protocols for exchanging in-
formation for distributed detection. We also provide efficient algorithms
for misuse detection, and protocols for providing proof of misuse. Our
solutions can handle privacy issues associated with the exchange of infor-
mation for misuse detection. We have implemented the misuse detection
and recovery in DIPLOMA systems running on Linux operating systems,
and conducted extensive experimental evaluation of the system in Orbit
MANET testbed. The results show our system is effective in detecting
and containing multipath misuses.
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1 Introduction
Consent-based networking is emerging as a “clean-slate” design for providing
security against multiple attacks in the Internet [12, 5, 17, 4]. In consent-based
networking, a sender needs to have permission to send traffic to a destination.
Consent-based architectures may support permission to send to a destination
on a particular path (path-based) or on any path (destination-based). In path-
based consent architectures, every node (or realm) in the path from a source to
a destination need to give consent to send traffic. This gives the nodes control
over the traffic passing through them, making it suitable for networks like the
Internet, where there are multiple providers (or administrative domains) and the
paths are mostly static. In destination-based consent architectures, permission is
given to send traffic to a destination on any of the available paths; intermediate
nodes honor those permissions and forward the traffic. This architecture is useful
for networks where the paths are dynamic, as in mobile ad-hoc networks.
In a consent-based system, senders are given the permission to send traffic in
the form of verifiable proofs of consent (capabilities). The nodes perform band-
width enforcement by rate controlling the bandwidth used for the flows that are
part of the capability. In destination-based consent architectures, it is possible
to use the capability to reach a destination on multiple paths. In those cases,
not all traffic corresponding to a capability may go through a node. Hence, any
single node may not be able to enforce the bandwidth constraints of the capa-
bility. Furthermore, a node that has authority over multiple destination nodes
may assign permission to reach those destinations in a single capability. Hence,
the same capability may be used for multiple unrelated flows. Even if all the
traffic passes through a node, the node may be unable to enforce the bandwidth
constraints across unrelated flows due to high processing required to account
for traffic across the flows. It is also possible for certain nodes to collude with
senders allowing for larger bandwidth than the one allocated in the capability.
When misuse prevention is not feasible, we need a detection mechanism. Once
misuse is detected, the capability may be revoked or temporarily not honored,
or the node misusing the capability may be isolated.
Recently proposed DIPLOMA [4, 3] is a destination-based consent architec-
ture for MANETs based on the concept of network capabilities [5]. A capabil-
ity is a cryptographically sealed token of authority that has associated rights.
DIPLOMA capabilities propagate both access control rules and traffic-shaping
parameters that should govern a node’s traffic. All the nodes in the path from
a source to a destination can verify and enforce the capability. The architecture
is based on deny-by-default paradigm, where nodes can only access the ser-
vices and hosts they are authorized for by the capabilities given to them. Thus,
DIPLOMA provides two main features: access control of the end-host services,
and protection of network bandwidth.
In this paper, we identify the sources of misuse in DIPLOMA and provide
solutions for detecting those misuses. A misuse may constitute either the use
of a capability in multiple paths to a destination, or the use of the same capa-
bility to multiple destinations. The detection of misuse may be done based on
the information locally available to the node (local detection), or based on the
information exchanged among the nodes (distributed detection).
To provide solutions for detecting misuses, we enhance the capability estab-
lishment protocol to enable nodes to detect the misuses. We also describe the
protocols for communicating the information about the flows going through the
nodes to enable distributed detection. We also provide efficient algorithms for
detecting misuses.
The node detecting a misuse should be able to provide the proof of the same,
so that other nodes can take action based on the misuse. Our solution can provide
the proof of the misuse, so that rogue nodes cannot exploit the misuse detection
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algorithms itself. Our solution also handles privacy issues associated with the
exchange of information about the flows.
We implemented our algorithms in the Orbit lab testbed [1]. We show that
the algorithms require minimum processing and memory. We also show that the
amount of information exchanged for the misuse detection algorithm is minimal.
We also conduct extensive experiments on capability misuses, and show that our
system effectively detects and contains these misuses.
2 Misuses in consent-based architectures
The misuses in consent-based architectures depend on the type of the architec-
ture and the resources it is trying to protect. It depends whether the consent is
for a particular path or on any path to the destination. The misuse also depends
on whether the consent has any bandwidth constraint or it is just an access
constraint (i.e. unlimited bandwidth).
In architectures like network capabilities [5, 16, 17] and visas [7], consent is
given to access the receiver in any path. In network capabilities, all the nodes
from a source to destination participate in the protocol. In visas, on other hand,
only the source and destination networks are involved in the protocol. In ICING
architecture [12], consent is given for a particular path. ICING also requires that
all the intermediate nodes from the source to destination give explicit consent
for the packet to go through. In DIPLOMA, consent is given for any path, but
enforcement is done at all the intermediate nodes from source to destination.
Another factor that influences the misuse is whether the consent based archi-
tecture depends on the trusted nature of the routers or intermediate nodes and
security of the communication medium. If the protocol assumes trusted inter-
mediate nodes, it may be possible to overcome the protection by compromising
the routers. In general, protocols designed for wired networks assume trusted
routers. DIPLOMA is designed for wireless networks where the routers may not
be trusted and the communication medium is broadcast in nature.
A consent-based architecture may provide only access control or may addi-
tionally provide bandwidth limitations. It is easier to enforce bandwidth con-
straints on the path-based architectures. In destination based architecture like
DIPLOMA, which also provides bandwidth constraints, it is a challenge to en-
force the bandwidth constraints due to use of multiple paths to a destination;
the constraints has to be enforced across all the paths. The focus of this paper
is to detect and recover from misuses involving multiple paths.
3 DIPLOMA Overview
We assume wireless ad-hoc network setting where the nodes have limited mo-
bility. In DIPLOMA architecture, the resources needed to access a service are
allocated by the group controller(s) (GCs) of the MANET. Group controllers are
nodes responsible for maintaining the group membership for a set of MANET
nodes, and a priori authorize communications within the group. This means
that GCs do not participate in the actual communications, nor do they need
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Fig. 1. System overview
to be consulted by nodes in real time; in fact, if they distribute the appropri-
ate policies ahead of time, they need not even be members of the MANET. In
some cases, the GC may be reachable through a high-energy-consumption, high-
latency, low-bandwidth long-range link (e.g., a satellite connection); interactions
in such an environment should be kept to a minimum, and only for exceptional
circumstances (e.g., for revoking access for compromised nodes). The resource
allocation by GC to a node is represented as a credential (capability) called pol-
icy token, and it can be used to express the services and the bandwidth a node
is allowed to access. They are cryptographically signed by the GC, which can be
verified any node in the MANET.
When a node (initiator) requests a service from another MANET node (re-
sponder) using the policy token assigned to the initiator, the responder can
provide a capability back to the initiator. This is called a network capability,
and it is generated based on the resource policy assigned to the responder and
its dynamic conditions (e.g., level of utilization).
Figure 1 gives a brief overview of DIPLOMA. All nodes in the path between
an initiator to a responder (i.e., nodes relaying the packets) enforce and abide by
the resource allocation encoded by the GC in the policy token and the responder
in the network capability. The enforcement involves both access control and
bandwidth allocation. A responder accepts packets (except for the first) from
an initiator only if the initiator is authorized to send, in the form of a valid
network capability. It accepts the first packet only if the initiator’s policy token
is included. An intermediate node will forward the packets from a node only
if they have an associated policy token or network capability, and if they do
not violate the conditions contained therein. Possession of a capability does
not imply resource reservation; they are the maximum limits a node can use.
Available resources are allocated by the intermediate nodes in a fair manner, in
proportion to the allocations defined in the capability.
The capability need not be contained in all packets. The first packet car-
ries the capability, along with a transaction identifier (TXI) and a public key.
Subsequent packets contain only the TXI and a packet signature based on that
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public key. Intermediate nodes cache policy tokens and network capabilities in
a capability database, treating them as soft state. A capability database entry
contains the source and the destination addresses, TXI, the capability, public
key for the packet signature and packet statistics. Capability retransmissions
update the soft state of intermediate nodes when the route changes due to node
mobility. The soft state after a route change is also updated using an on-demand
query for the capability database entry from the upstream nodes.
3.1 Misuses in DIPLOMA
In this section, we identify ways of misusing capabilities in destination-based
consent systems like DIPLOMA. These includes simultaneous use of a capability
on multiple paths to get more than allocated bandwidth, or misusing a policy
to create network capabilities more than the policy is entitled to.
Misuse of policy tokens: Policy tokens are capabilities allocated by the
group controllers to the nodes to access the services running on other nodes in
MANET. The node for which the policy token is allocated is called owner of that
policy token. A policy token contains the owner, the destination node, the type
of service, the allocated bandwidth, and the signature of the group controller.
The destination field of a policy token may correspond to a specific host or a
group of hosts. A sender (i.e., the owner) can send traffic to multiple receivers
simultaneously using a policy token that has authorization to access those re-
ceivers. While accessing multiple receivers, the sender should not exceed the
total bandwidth allocated to that policy token. A misbehaving sender may try
to exceed this allocation by deliberately communicating with multiple receivers
without satisfying the overall bandwidth constraints of the capability. We call
this misuse as concurrent-destination misuse.
Another way to misuse the capabilities is to use multiple paths to the receiver.
The sender may use the same capability on multiple paths, and may claim the
bandwidth allocation of the capability in each of the paths. This way the sender
can bypass the bandwidth enforcement that is performed by the intermediate
nodes. Though the receiver can easily detect this kind misuse, it might be col-
laborating with the sender to receive a larger bandwidth. We call this misuse as
multi-path misuse.
Misuses of network capabilities: Network capabilities are the capabilities
issued by the receiver nodes to the senders that authorize sending traffic to those
receivers. They are similar to policy tokens, except that the destination field
cannot be arbitrary; it has to be the receiver that issued the capability. The
capabilities also need to contain a signed policy issued by the group controller
authorizing the receiver to issue such a capability.
Nodes can misuse a network capability in two ways: either by a receiver is-
suing more than it is entitled to, or by a sender sending more than the network
capability. A sender could misuse the network capability by sending the capa-
bility over multiple paths. This is same as the multi-path misuse. Note that
concurrent destination misuse is not possible with network capabilities, since
those capabilities have fixed destination.
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A receiver creating network capabilities may perform another form of misuse.
The receiver needs to conform to the policy while creating network capabilities.
A policy puts an upper bound on the amount of bandwidth a receiver may
allocate to capabilities simultaneously. A receiver might not abide by this policy,
and might allocate more network capabilities than it is entitled to. We call this
misuse as policy misuse.
4 System Architecture
Figure 2 shows the architecture of the misuse detection system in DIPLOMA.
The DIPLOMA engine, which is responsible for packet processing and capabil-
ity enforcement, collects the information about the capabilities going through
the node and provides them to the misuse detection engine. This information
is stored in the local records table. The detection engine may also receive the
information about the communication flows and the associated capabilities from
other nodes, which are stored in the external records table. The detection en-
gine periodically runs the misuse detection algorithm described in Section 5 on
these records. Whenever the algorithm detects a misuse, it informs the local
DIPLOMA engine as well as the misuse detection engines of the other nodes.
The DIPLOMA engine makes use of this information while accepting the capa-
bilities for connection establishment and packet forwarding.
Based on where the flow information is obtained, the misuse detection algo-
rithm is classified as local or distributed.
Local detection: In many cases, we can detect capability misuse using
the local information a node has, received either through the packets passing
through that node, or by listening to the channel and snooping on the packets
in its neighborhood. For example, a receiver can detect any misuse by a sender
directed towards it. Nodes in the sender’s neighborhood may be able to hear all
the packets by listening to the channel. In those cases, a neighboring node will
be able to detect any misuse by a sender, and provide a proof of the misuse.
Distributed detection: When it is not possible to detect the misuse based
on local information, we resort to distributed detection. For example, if the
sender is using a directional antenna, then its neighboring nodes may not be able
to hear all the packets it has sent. A misuse may be targeted towards multiple
receivers; hence, a single receiver cannot detect it. Even if a misuse involves a
single receiver, the receiver may be colluding with the sender and may not report
the misuse. In distributed detection, the nodes periodically exchange information
about the flows passing through them. The misuse detection algorithm is run
using the combination of the information a node collected locally and what it
received from other nodes. In distributed detection, one or more nodes in the
MANET are designated as verifier nodes. All the other nodes (called collector
nodes) send information about the flows going through them to one or more
of these verifier nodes. The verifier nodes run the misuse detection algorithm,
and inform the collector nodes about any misbehaving nodes and the associated
capabilities, along with proof of misuse.
Figure 3 illustrates the types of the detection methods that are useful in
various misuse scenarios. Whether distributed detection is required or not is
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Fig. 2. Misuse detection architecture
Fig. 3. Various types of capability reuse and
detection algorithm
dictated by whether there exists any common node in the misuse paths, and
whether the common node is willing to co-operate. A common node can run the
detection algorithm based on the local information alone to identify, and report
the misuse. For the misuse involving multiple paths to a single destination, the
receiver is always a common node. If all the common nodes are colluding with
the sender, then a distributed detection is required.
Our solution consists of the following: a capability-encoding scheme that
aids detection, protocols for exchanging information for distributed detection,
and detection algorithms.
4.1 Capability encoding
In the DIPLOMA architecture, it is permissible to use a capability for multiple
communication sessions concurrently. For example, a node possessing a policy
token to communicate with a group of destinations may be simultaneously com-
municating with multiple nodes in that destination group. Similarly, it is possible
to use a policy authorizing the issue of the network capability to create multiple
capabilities simultaneously. For example, a node may be receiving packets from
multiple source nodes, and may want to allocate network capabilities to those
senders based on a single policy authorizing the allocations. Both of these con-
current uses of policies are valid as long as the nodes do not use (or allocate)
more bandwidth than allowed by the policies. When the nodes split the band-
width of a policy into multiple capabilities, we need protocols that enable other
nodes to check if these capabilities are within the limit.
While sending the policy token or while creating receiver capabilities, the
owner has to decide on how to split the available bandwidth. The protocol al-
lows dividing the available bandwidth into 32 or 64 equal sized slots, which are
represented using a bitmask of 32 or 64 bits. We call this bitmask as the alloca-
tion vector. A bit in the allocation vector is set, if the corresponding bandwidth
slot is used. The allocation vector is included in the capability request packets,
as well as on the network capabilities created by the receivers. For a policy token
that a sender is using to communicate with multiple destinations, the allocation
vector on a capability request indicates the portion of the available bandwidth
allocated to that communication session. When a sender uses multiple paths to
reach a destination, the allocation vectors on the capability requests on each of
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the paths indicate the portion of the available bandwidth from the capability
allocated to that path. If a receiver node creates multiple network capabilities,
based on a policy, the allocation vector field in the capability indicates the por-
tion of the available bandwidth allocated to that capability. Note that there
could be multiple bits set in the allocation vector indicating bandwidth alloca-
tion proportional to number of bits set in the vector.
It is permissible to allocate the same bandwidth slot to different capabilities,
derived from the same policy, at different times. Every capability request and
network capabilities contain a start time stamp and a validity duration, which
indicates the time until they are valid. To extend its validity, the owner needs to
create a new request. Hence, a misuse constitute the existence of two capability
requests for the same capability, or two network capabilities for the same policy
that has a common bit set in their allocation vector at the same time.
Our misuse detection algorithms do not depend on the data structure used for
dividing the allocated bandwidth. Allocation vectors have easy representation,
and allow for easy unions and intersection operations using bitwise operators.
If finer granularity is needed in dividing the bandwidth, one could use other
representations like slab allocation.
4.2 Communication protocol
When a sender node wants to communicate with a receiver node, it uses the
capability request packet to inform the intermediate nodes about the capability
that will be used for the communication [4]. This request is signed by the sender’s
private key. To avoid any non-repudiation of the capability request by the sender,
the nodes participating in the misuse detection are required to store the capabil-
ity request and the signature. The capability request have many information that
are not necessary for the misuse detection. Storing this information puts undue
burden on the misuse detection nodes. One way to solve this problem is to sign
the information that are essential for misuse detection (called misuse detection
block), separately from that which are not useful for misuse detection (called
capability establishment block). Unfortunately, this requires senders to perform
two expensive signature operations. As a compromise between the amount of
information stored by nodes and the processing needed at the sender, we sign
the request in two steps. First, the sender computes the hash of the capability
establishment block. Then, it signs the combination of this hash and the misuse
detection block. To prove capability misuse by a sender, the nodes only need to
keep track of the hash, the misuse detection block, and the signature.
A capability request packet contains the capability establishment block and
misuse detection block. A node can verify the capability request by first comput-
ing the hash of the capability establishment block, and verifying the signature
for the combination of hash and the misuse detection block. A valid signature
indicates that the packet was not tampered with. We also use a similar scheme
for signing the networks capabilities created by the receiver nodes.
Information exchange: For the distributed detection, the detector nodes
send information about the communication sessions and the capabilities pass-
ing through them to the verifier nodes. The detector nodes use the underlying
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MANET unicast or multicast routing protocol to reach the verifier nodes. The
information required to detect misuse consists of the identity of the sender node,
the transaction identifier, serial number and the issuer of the capability, the al-
location vector, the time stamps, and the previous and next nodes in the path.
This information about the communication session is called a record. A node can
send multiple records in a packet. The nodes sign the packet using their private
keys. A similar record is also send for the network capabilities for detecting mis-
uses in them. The algorithms used for detection of the misuse by the senders,
and the receivers are similar. Hence, we will deal only with the sender misuse in
rest of the paper.
5 Detection Algorithms
In this Section, we describe the DIPLOMA misuse detection algorithms that are
used for both local and distributed detection. Then we describe how a verifier
node can provide a proof of misuse. Finally, we provide solution for handling the
privacy issues in our misuse detection architecture.
Recall that there is a misuse if there are two communication sessions that use
the same capability and have a common bit set in the allocation vectors with
overlapping validity periods. Hence, the goal of the algorithm is to find such
communication sessions. To that end, the algorithm first groups the records cor-
responding to a communication session. This is because there could be multiple
records for a communication, received from different collector nodes. Once the
records of communication sessions are grouped together, the algorithm look at
records across the communication sessions to identify misuse.
In DIPLOMA, a communication session can be uniquely identified by the
(transaction identifier, sender identity) pair. If the sender uses multiple paths to
a destination, the sender is required to use different transaction identifiers for
each path.
The misuse detection algorithm has two phases. In the first phase, it removes
the duplicate records for each communication sessions from the collection of
records it gathered locally and from other nodes. It also detects if a sender uses
the same transaction identifier on multiple paths. The output of the first phase
is a set of records, consisting of at most one record for a transaction identifier
per sender. This phase is not required if all the records are obtained from the
capability database of the local DIPLOMA engine, as the engine already prevents
duplicates. In the second phase, the algorithm detects if there is any misuse on
the filtered records output by the first phase.
5.1 Phase 1 - Duplicate removal and multipath detection
The removal of duplicate records for a communication session is performed by
sorting the records based on (sender, transaction id) pair and keeping only one
record per pair. However, this step will not detect use of the same transaction
identifier by a sender on multiple paths. To detect the multiple path misuse, we
use the following property of the paths.
If the same transaction id is used in two different paths to a destination, then
there will be two records for it that has a common previous node or a common
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Fig. 4. Properties of multiple paths in aiding misuse detection
next node. This is because since the source and the destination nodes are common
in both paths, the paths need to bifurcate at some node and join at another node.
If the paths are bifurcating at any node other than the sender, or joins anywhere
other than the receiver, then the DIPLOMA engine at the common nodes in the
path can detect the misuse during the connection establishment stage. If the
paths are node disjoint and the receiver is not colluding with the misbehaving
sender, then the receiver can detect misuse. If all the common nodes are colluding
with the sender, then the phase 1 algorithm can detect the misuse looking for
the common nodes. This is depicted in Figure 4.
Algorithm 1 describes the phase 1 algorithm. It goes through the records
corresponding to the same (sender, transaction id) pair and verifies that all the
records use the same capability, allocation vector and time stamps. It also stores
the previous nodes and the next nodes of each record in temporary arrays. The
presence of duplicates in these arrays indicates a misuse.
Analysis: The algorithm will fail to detect a multipath misuse if certain
nodes collude with the sender and do not provide the relevant records to the
verifier. If the common nodes, including the receiver, collude with the sender,
then local detection of the multipath misuse will fail. If at least one of the nodes
in the path next to the common node colludes, where the forking of the paths
has occurred, then the algorithm will fail to detect that common node. Similarly
if one of the nodes before the common node at which the joining of the paths
take place, then also the algorithm will fail to detect the common next node. The
algorithm will fail to detect a multipath to a destination, when it cannot detect
both the common previous and next nodes. This is depicted in Figure 4. It is still
possible for a verifier to detect that it has not received records from some of the
nodes (which may be colluding with the sender), because of the existence of two
path fragments (as opposed to one path) for the transaction identifier. However,
we cannot use this against the sender, because of the possibility of packet losses,
or the possibility of a node deliberately not sending the records to the verifier.
5.2 Phase 2 - Reuse of the capability detection
The second phase, the algorithm detects misuse of capabilities across the com-
munication sessions. Recall that a misuse is identified by a common bit set in
the allocation vectors at overlapping validity periods. The input to phase 2 is the
records output by phase 1. Hence, there is only one record per communication
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Algorithm 1 Duplicate-record removal & multi-path detection
1: Li ← List of all (source node, transaction id) pair
2: Lu ← NULL {Output list of unique records}
3: for all id ∈ Li do
4: Lr ← List of records for id
5: Hprev,Hnext ← NULL
6: Add first record of Lr to Lu
7: for all rec ∈ Lr do
8: if attributes of rec different from head(Lr) then
9: print Misuse. Different attributes for same transaction
10: else if prevhop(rec) ∈ Hprev or nexthop(rec) ∈ Hnext then
11: print Misuse. Same transaction in different paths
12: end if




Fig. 5. Computation of aggregate allocation vector and misuse detection using interval
graphs.
session. The algorithm goes through all the records corresponding to each of the
capabilities and detects misuse.
The algorithm treats the records as an interval graph, where each record
corresponds to an interval for which they are active. There is an allocation vector
associated with each interval, which is the allocation vector of the corresponding
record. We define the aggregate allocation vector at any point of time as the union
of the allocation vectors of the intervals passing through it. There is misuse at
any point in time if the intersection of any two intervals passing through it is
not empty. This is depicted in Figure 5.
Once the interval graph is formed, we can detect any misuse in linear time
in the number of intervals. The algorithm goes through the end points of the
intervals in increasing time and updates the aggregate allocation vector. At the
beginning of the algorithm, this vector is set to NULL. Whenever the algorithm
considers the beginning of an interval, it checks if the intersection of the aggregate
allocation vector and the allocation vector of that interval is non-empty. If it is
not empty, then there is misuse. Otherwise, the allocation vector of that interval
is added to the aggregate vector. Similarly, when the algorithm considers the end
of an interval, its allocation vector is subtracted from the aggregate allocation
vector. If there are both entering and leaving intervals at any point, then the
leaving operation is considered before the entering operation. This is because the
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new entering interval could use slots from the leaving interval, without causing
misuse.
Figure 5 illustrates the computation of aggregate allocation vector and the
misuse detection. There are six flows labeled as a, b, . . . , f . They are represented
as the intervals in which they are active. Their corresponding allocation vectors
are also shown. For simplicity of illustration, we use the allocation vector of 4
bits. The vector on the top line shows the aggregate allocation vector when the
flows enter or leave the system. The aggregate vector at any point is the union
of the allocation vectors of the interval going through that point. There is no
misuse for flows a, b, . . . , e. The flow f uses one of the slots of flow d, hence there
is misuse. The aggregate allocation vector before f entered the system was 1101.
The flow f uses one bandwidth slot. The sender assigned it the slot 0001, which
is a reuse of the existing slot. If the sender had assigned it the slot 0010, then
there would not be any misuse. Hence, it is important that senders allocate the
right bandwidth slot for flows.
Creating an interval graph from the records is performed by sorting the
endpoints of the interval. In fact, our algorithm maintains two sorted lists: one
for the starting points of the intervals and the second for the ending points of
the intervals. The algorithm is given in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Phase 2 - checking for reuse of bandwidth slots
1: Li ← List of all (capability id, issuer) pair
2: for all id ∈ Li do
3: Lr ← List of records for id
4: Ls ← Records in Lr sorted on start time
5: Le ← Records in Lr sorted on end time
6: aggregate← φ
7: while Ls not empty do
8: times ← starttime(head(Ls))
9: timee ← endtime(head(Le))
10: if timee ≤ times then
11: rec← head(Le)
12: Le ← Le − rec
13: aggregate← aggregate− allocvector(rec)
14: else
15: rec← head(Ls)
16: Ls ← Ls − rec
17: if aggregate∩ allocvector(rec) 6= NULL then
18: print Misuse. Reuse of bandwidth slots.
19: end if






In the protocol presented so far, the detector nodes send the information about
all the flows going through them to the verifier. Even though the records contain
only the sender node identity and does not have the receiver identities of the
flow, it is still possible to deduce the receiver identity by following the path using
the previous and next hop information. Hence, the verifier can know about the
source and destination of all the flows. Another privacy concern is the knowledge
about the number of flows a sender is sending, even if the verifier is not interested
in knowing the receivers.
We can modify the protocol to honor privacy, and still detect the misuse as
follows. The detection algorithm continues to function even if all the fields in
the records, except the time stamps and the allocation vector, were encrypted
with a key that is common across all the flows corresponding to a capability. The
detector nodes can create such a key by taking a known function (e.g., hash)
of the capability. Since the flows are going through the detector nodes, they
know about the complete capability associated with the flow. However, verifier
knows only about their serial numbers, and cannot recreate the keys. Hence,
verifier cannot decrypt the records for the flows not going through it. In this
scheme, the verifier can still get information about all the flows that use any of
the capabilities passing through it.
6 Experimental evaluation
In this section, we study the effectiveness of the misuse detection algorithms.
The experiments were conducted in the Orbit Lab Testbed [1]. The algorithms
were implemented on DIPLOMA systems running on Debian Linux with kernel
2.6.30. We analyzed memory, bandwidth and processing overheads, and found
them to be minimal; due to lack of space we omit the results.
6.1 Effectiveness in Containing attacks
Now we study the effectiveness of misuse detection algorithm in detecting and
containing the attacks. We used the topology given in Figure 6, created by
assigning non-overlapping channels of 802.11b and 802.11a to the links [3].
In this set of experiments, there are four flows: two by good nodes and two
by the attacker. Each of the senders is allocated a capability of 4 Mbps. All the
flows were created using UDP iperf. The good nodes, 2 and 5, send traffic at 4
Mbps each to the destinations nodes 7 and node 4 respectively. We denote those
flows as flow 1 and flow 2 respectively and call them good flows. Flow 1 takes
the path 2 − 8 − 6 − 7 and flow 2 takes the path 5 − 8 − 3 − 4. These flows are
started at time 0 seconds and last for 120 seconds. The attacker, which is the
node 1, sends flows to nodes 4 and 7, which we denote by flows 3 and 4. We
call these attack flows. Each of the attack flows are 12 Mbps, even though the
attacker has one capability with the allocated bandwidth of 4 Mbps, which can
be used for either destination. Flow 3 is started at time 30 seconds and takes
the path 1− 2− 3− 4. Flow 4 is started at time 60 seconds and takes the path
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Fig. 6. Topology to study the performance of
detection algorithm
Fig. 7. Bandwidth of flows in a system that
does not require consent to send
all the bits in the allocation vector set. Hence, the attacker launches two types
of attacks. First, it is sending higher bandwidth than that is allocated in the
capability, which starts at time 30 seconds. Secondly, it uses the same capability
to talk to multiple destinations simultaneously using the same bandwidth slot.
This attack starts at time 60 seconds.
We conduct three sets of experiments. The first is called the original, and
does not require any consent for sending the traffic. This scheme cannot pro-
tect against both the attacks. Then we use the consent-based scheme, where
DIPLOMA requires capabilities for sending traffic. This DIPLOMA without
misuse detection, can handle the first bandwidth hogging attack but cannot pre-
vent reuse of the capability across the flows. Finally, we use DIPLOMA with
misuse detection to handle both types of attacks. For each of the experiments,
we report the bandwidth of each of the flow over a period of time. All experi-
ments were run 6 times, and we show the average bandwidth. The iperf servers
(receivers) measured the bandwidths at 5 second intervals.
Figure 7 shows the results for the original system. In this system, until 30
seconds, where there are only two flows from the good nodes, both the flows get
their requested 4 Mbps bandwidth. At 30 seconds, when the first attacker flow
(flow 3) arrives, the bandwidth of the good flows drop as the attacker flow takes
up most of the bandwidth. The attacker receives a bandwidth between 8 and 8.5
Mbps, whereas the bandwidth of good flows drop to 3 Mbps. At 60 seconds, when
the second attack flow arrives (flow 4), the bandwidth of the good flows further
drops along with the bandwidth of the first attacker flow. The bandwidth of the
flow 1 and flow 2 drops to 1.1 Mbps and 2.7 Mbps respectively. The bandwidth
of first attacker flow drops to 4.6 Mbps. The new attacker flow receives 2.6 Mbps.
This trend continues until 120 seconds, when the good flows end. At that point,
the first attacker flow bandwidth recovers to its previous levels (8 Mbps) and the
second attacker flow receives a higher bandwidth of 5.8 Mbps. At 150 seconds,
when the first attacker flow ends, the second attacker flow receives 11.8 Mbps,
which is close to the requested bandwidth of that flow.
Figure 8 shows the results for the DIPLOMA scheme when misuse detection
is not in effect. Until 30 Seconds, where the attacker had not started sending





















































flow1 flow2 flow3 flow4
Fig. 8. Bandwidth of the flows in DIPLOMA
without misuse detection
Fig. 9. Bandwidth of the flows in DIPLOMA
with misuse detection
their capability. The bandwidth reported by the flows is 3.74 Mbps, which is
slightly less than the allocated 4 Mbps due to the additional headers present in
DIPLOMA packets. At 30 seconds, when the attacker starts sending the first
attack flow (flow 3) at the rate of 12 Mbps, the bandwidth of the good flows
drops only slightly to 3.71 Mbps. The attacker gets a bandwidth of 3.5 Mbps,
which is closer to its allocated bandwidth. Hence, the consent-based DIPLOMA
scheme is able to protect the good flows and contain the attacker to its allocated
bandwidth. At 60 seconds, when the second attack flow (flow 4) starts, the
bandwidth of the good flows and the attacker drops. This drop for the good
flow is not as drastic as the original scheme. Here the bandwidth of the flow 1
drops to 2.3 Mbps and that of flow 2 drops to 3 Mbps. The existing attacker flow
drops to 2.9 Mbps, and the new attacker flow receives 1.9 Mbps bandwidth. This
drop in bandwidth is due to limited available bandwidth on the network. The
attacker is reusing the capability at this point, and DIPLOMA ends up honoring
the same capability in two node disjoint paths. At 120 s, the genuine flow ends.
At that point, the first attack flow bandwidth moves back to its original level
of 3.5 Mbps. The second attacker flow bandwidth ends up at 3.3 Mbps. This
increase is due to the freed up capacity from the good flows. At 150 seconds, the
first attack flow ends and the second attack bandwidth increases slightly to 3.6
Mbps. Even then, the bandwidth of the individual attack flows does not go above
the allocated bandwidth of 4 Mbps, because DIPLOMA enforces the bandwidth.
Therefore, in DIPLOMA without the misuse detection, an attacker cannot go
above the allocated bandwidth in a single path. However, it can bypass that
check by sending traffic to multiple destinations in disjoint paths, if the capability
permits it. When this happens, genuine traffic is affected due to capacity sharing.
Figure 9 shows the results for the DIPLOMA system with misuse detection.
The behavior of the system is same as DIPLOMA without misuse detection, until
the misuse happens at 60 seconds. At 60 seconds, when the attacker sends the
second flow (flow 4), which constitutes a capability reuse, the behavior changes
from DIPLOMA without the misuse detection. In this case, the nodes send the
record to the verifier (node 8), which detects the misuse. In this experiment, the
period at which nodes send the record is 10 seconds. Hence, the verifier detects
















































Misuse record reporting period (s)
flow3
flow4
Fig. 10. Time to detect the misuse for differ-
ent record reporting periods
Fig. 11. Additional attack traffic after mis-
use for different record reporting periods
nodes starts to block the attack flows. The drop of the attack bandwidth is
gradual due the nature of our implementation [3]. The bandwidth of the good
flows drops to 2.8 Mbps and 3.3 Mbps for a short duration (10 seconds) at 60
seconds while the misuse detection and recovery takes place. At 85 seconds, the
recovery is complete and the bandwidth of the good flows moves back to the
levels before the reuse attack. Even after the genuine flow ends at 120 s, the
attacker flows continue to be blocked due to their misuse action. This continues
even after the attacker stops the misuse at 150 seconds, when the first attacker
flow ends. Hence, DIPLOMA can effectively contain capability misuse.
6.2 Speed of detecting misuse
Next, we study how fast our scheme can detect the misuses and communicate
with the affected nodes. The time to detect the misuse will depend on the fre-
quency at which records are sent to the verifiers. Hence, we study the misuse
detection speed as a function of that period, using the same set of flows as in
the previous experiment.
Figure 10 plots the time required at the detector nodes to get the misuse
notification after the misuse happened for various record reporting periods. For
the periods up to 30 seconds, the time to detect is the same as the period. Hence,
the misuse is detected as soon as the record is received to the verifier. For the
periods 40 and 50 seconds the time to detect misuse was less than the period,
and for 60 seconds the detection time was the same as the period. This is because
for 40 and 50 seconds experiments, the start of the attack and the start of the
period may not have been synchronized. Hence, it is possible for the detectors
to send the record to the verifier in time less than the period after the attack
has happened. The verifier detects the misuse upon receiving the records.
6.3 Attack bandwidth after misuse
Now we study the amount of additional traffic the attacker is able to send after
the misuse. This quantity depends on how fast the system is able to detect
the misuse and take action against the attacker. Hence, we study the additional
traffic as a function of record reporting period. We use the same flows and attack
scenario as the previous experiment and measure the data received at the receiver
for the attack flows (flows 3 and 4), after the misuse has started.
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Figure 11 plots the amount of traffic received at the receivers for the attack
flows after the misuse, for different record reporting periods. Up to 30 seconds,
the attack traffic increases as the record reporting time increases. This is be-
cause the misuse traffic will be treated as the legitimate traffic and allowed to
pass through until the misuse is detected; and the misuse detection time is pro-
portional to the record reporting period. Note that even if the attacker is trying
to send the traffic at 12 Mbps, the throughput the flows receive is less than 4
Mbps due to bandwidth enforcement by the intermediate nodes. In this set of
experiments, the flow 3 had slightly higher bandwidth than flow 4, similar to the
experiment in Figure 9. For 40 and 50 seconds, the attack traffic drops is less
than that of 30 seconds, as the misuse is detected before the complete period as
explained in the previous experiment.
7 Related Work
The concept of capabilities was used in operating system for securing resources
[15]. Follow-on work investigated the controlled exposure of resources at the
network layer using the concept of “visas” for packets [7], which is similar to
network capabilities. More recently, network capabilities were proposed to pre-
vent DDoS attacks [5]. We extend the concept to MANETs and use it for both
access control and traffic shaping [4, 3]. All these works represent destination-
based consent architectures. Path-based consent architectures in the context of
Internet have also been proposed [12].
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) for MANETs is an active area of research
[10]. In the Local Intrusion Detection Architecture [2] communities of nodes are
formed, which exchange various security data and intrusion alerts. The nodes
can also place mobile agents in the other nodes, to do a specific mission in
an autonomous and asynchronous manner. Distributed IDS architecture [18] is
another proposed IDS architecture for MANETs. It uses a local detection engine,
with the input from the local data collection, and a co-operative detection engine,
with the input from the neighboring nodes to detect intrusions.
Solutions are also proposed to specifically detect attacks on routing protocols
based on the protocol specification. [8] detects violations in the protocol specifica-
tion based on an extended finite state automation (EFSA) of AODV. Distributed
Evidence-Driven Message Exchange Intrusion Detection Model (DEMEM) [13]
detects inconsistency among the routing messages in OLSR. [6] models the at-
tacks on AODV protocol using attack tree and identify the damages. Proposals
are also made when to isolate a misbehaving node based on the criticality of
that node in maintaining the connectivity [14]. There is also a rich literature on
detecting DoS and node replication attacks in sensor networks [9, 11].
8 Conclusions and Future Work
We identified sources of misuse in destination-based consent architectures and
provided a distributed solution for detecting misuses. Our solution is demon-
strated for DIPLOMA, a consent-based architecture for MANETs. DIPLOMA
is a deny-by-default distributed policy enforcement architecture based on capabil-
ities. We provided capability encodings and protocols for exchanging information
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for distributed misuse detection, and presented efficient algorithms for misuse
detection. We showed through experimental evaluations that our algorithms are
effective in identifying and containing the misuse. In the future, we plan to mea-
sure the energy consumed for detecting misuses and the energy savings due to
preventing attacks, and to look at misuse in path-based consent architectures.
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